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Professor Braun’s speech at the ceremony granting the title of Professor Honoris Causa of 
the University of Bucharest addressed the struggle of post-totalitarian societies to establish 
consolidated democracies. While emphasizing his own experience with totalitarian regimes, he 
also assessed the global state of democracy and human rights.  
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It is a great honor and pleasure for me to be here in Bucharest and I wish 
to thank the members of the Senate, the faculty, those who initiated the process 
and the entire University of Bucharest for this award and invitation.  
For someone whose ancestry is in this country, this is an especially 
meaningful award. Moreover, for a person whose parents had suffered the 
horrors and ravages of both Nazism and Stalinism it is a special occasion for me 
to come to a free country, one which despite all the monumental problems of 
transition has chosen to join the community of democratic states and is now a 
member of both NATO and the European Union.  
Democracies, however, do not offer guarantees; they represent only 
opportunities, and even in the best circumstances involve difficult struggles and 
adaptation. Further, as I am examining at a vast topic and facing a large canvas, 
please allow me to paint with a broad brush.  
                                                          
∗
  Aurel Braun (21 October 2011). International Relations and Eastern European Transitions: 
Continuing efforts and (mutual) adaptation. Speech presented at the Award Ceremony for the 
Conferal of the Honnorary Title of Professor Honoris Causa by the University of Bucharest. 
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It is also not my purpose to rekindle any debates between concepts of 
transition and notions of consolidated democracy. I proceed on the Jeffersonian 
assumption of democracy as a continuing struggle, where civic engagement 
remains crucial. As well, I do not especially wish to enmesh myself in a debate 
between approaches and methodologies, including one which had created a 
false dichotomy between comparative analysis on the one hand, and area studies 
on the other, as posited by Philippe C. Schmitter and Karl Terry. And I am not 
quite persuaded by Valerie Bunce’s seeming invitation to have transitologists 
"grounded". This, of course, is not meant to ignore either the historical past or 
valiant scholarly attempts at understanding change and direction, but I think it is 
well worth heeding Winston Churchill’s dictum that, “If we open a quarrel 
between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future”.  
Yet, in looking at the future, we should also be cognizant of the 
limitations of social science. As a social scientist, I must admit a great deal of 
discomfort with the term “science”, applied to what we do, for we certainly lack 
the precision, replicability, control, and predictability that physical sciences 
largely, if not always, offer. If we need any further invitation to humility, our 
collective inability in the social sciences and humanities to have predicted the 
tectonic changes in what was called the “Communist World”, barely two 
decades ago, should be a warning. Some of us, myself included, did indicate the 
possibility of fundamental change, but we lacked the confidence and courage to 
be specific and definitive. Humility aside though, my primary purpose here is 
not a mea culpa, but rather to draw lessons and divine trends and possibilities.  
I come to this topic and this enormously important region not because I 
naturally possess some great or special insight, but first as a result of the 
longevity of academic experience and association. My scholarly background is 
in international relations, international law, and political science. I have benefited 
from exceptional academic opportunities and institutional associations. I studied 
Marxism with one of its leading Western proponents, C.B. MacPherson, and 
then I had an opportunity to be influenced by one of that belief system’s most 
influential apostates, Leszek Kolakowski. I also studied with Allan Bloom, the 
author of The Closing of the American Mind, a controversial figure, yet one 
whose elegance of logic and passion for excellence were inspiring. As a visiting 
scholar at Stanford University twice in the 1980s, I had a chance to associate 
with: Seymour Martin Lipset, who stressed that it was not just about systems, 
but also about intuition; Sydney Hook, the renounced philosopher and exponent 
of “free will”, whose modesty and skepticism were touching; Milton Friedman, 
the Nobel Laureate economist who stressed to me as I was writing on Comecon 
and the Warsaw Pact, that the primary issues are usually about politics rather 
than economics; and Robert Conquest, the great historian of Soviet terror, who 
was able to decipher with amazing accuracy the character of totalitarianism 
before the KGB archives were opened up, through dogged scholarly 
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determination and intuition. From these and other scholars, I learned the 
importance of skepticism when facing “scholarly fashion”, the limits of 
methodologies, qualitative and quantitative, and the significance of talent and 
intuition while pursuing rigorous and probative analysis.  
Second, I approach the subject also as a practitioner. As head of the 
International Centre for Human Rights & Democratic Development (Rights & 
Democracy), in Montreal, I guide an organization whose mandate from the 
Parliament of Canada is to promote democracy and human rights globally. 
Though we have a rather small budget of only $13 million per annum, we have 
a large task, and we are concerned with the fact that, just as we welcome the 
expansion of freedom and democracy in many parts of the world, we are also 
witnessing the contraction of the "democratic space" in places, the return of 
dystopian regimes, and the hijacking of the language of human rights.  
Though my starting point, as usual, is International Relations, this is not 
necessarily the usual IR approach. Regardless of the starting point, my 
preference is an across-the-disciplines approach, where an understanding of the 
local is prime. As the late U.S. Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill, was fond of, 
and quite right in saying, “All politics is local”. Yet, while domestic factors are 
prime in many ways, they are certainly not exclusive. We live in a world that is 
both interconnected and interdependent. Consequently, there is a continuing and 
complex interaction among domestic and foreign variables, where developments 
are not necessarily linear, where there are large lacunae, where adaptability is 
essential, and yet predictability is too often ephemeral.  
It is a world where, thanks to cyberspace and social media, information is 
shared with amazing speed, even in some of the most remote parts of the world, 
and tyrannies have greater difficulty making themselves opaque. Nonetheless, 
we should also be keenly aware of how the speed of communication can add to 
distortion and can readily foster misinformation. Long before the current age, 
Winston Churchill had colorfully warned that “A lie gets half-way around the 
world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on”. 
Predicting trends and even possibilities though, as noted, remains 
exceedingly difficult. “Futurology” is an aspiration rather than reality, and 
Herman Kahn and Bertrand de Jouvenel, for instance, largely recognized this. 
The latter, in fact, wrote about The Art of Conjecture. That is, we are looking 
more at art than science, and it is worth keeping in mind the old Russian 
proverb, “The past, itself, is unpredictable; who dares predict the future?”. 
Consequently, what I am attempting here, using a large brush, is an across the 
disciplines synthesis that speaks to the need for multiple and interactive 
adaptation that comes in part from the international, but also speaks to the 
regional and local. Skepticism, here, moreover, as noted, should not be viewed 
as something to obviate the need for scholarly rigor and probative policy 
formulation and analysis.  
AUREL BRAUN 
 
6 
Competing approaches in international relations offer us both possibilities 
and caveats here. Realism, as the best realist theorists readily admit, has significant 
limitations (including uncertainty and volatility), but it has the benefit of 
enormous longevity. As we all know, we can go back more than two millennia 
and read with great benefit the Greek historian Thucydides’, History of the 
Peloponnesian Wars, the Chinese author Sun Tzu’s classic, The Art of War, or 
the Hindu statesman and philosopher Kautilya’s many works, as well as learn 
from modern writers such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Henry 
Kissinger, among others. Structural realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, have tried 
to “fix” the classical realists’ emphasis on the fearful and conflictual nature of 
humankind, by focusing on the structure of the international system to account 
for the behavior of states. The emphasis of structural realism (or neo-realism) 
on the most powerful states and the distribution of power among them, 
unfortunately though, created more rigidity than light and misunderstood the 
profoundness of power and its many dimensions that the realists saw in the full, 
including the essential factors of culture, morale, and diplomacy.  
Liberalism offers an alternative to realism, as we know, with an emphasis 
more on cooperation than conflict, and a prescription for coordination. The 
proposal to overcome the inherent anarchy and violence of the international 
system through carefully designed institutions for international cooperation, is 
certainly commendable. One may very well appreciate Liberalism's rejection of 
the idea that world is driven by a zero-sum game, where one state’s gain 
translates into another’s loss. Its view of world politics as a variable-sum game 
seems preferable, for we would like to believe that we should be able to create a 
system where all states simultaneously and mutually benefit through 
cooperation, both at the regional and at the international levels.  
The United Nations has been both the epitome and the central expression 
of the institutional/cooperative approach. Its foundational principle of collective 
security, predicated on the power of moral suasion, collective commitment to 
peace, rejection of aggression, and emphasis on human rights and equality, 
represent a signal opportunity in human history. The organization, however, has 
also sadly become the poster child of the massive failure of much of the 
institutional approach in international relations. An extraordinarily large and 
massively expensive institution, the UN has indeed performed some good in 
certain functional areas. It has failed though, I would argue, in terms of its 
central predicates.  
Just think, the General Assembly (GA) Presidency is currently in the 
hands of Qatar, a corrupt dictatorship. That same office in 2009, we should 
recall, was held by Libya, then led by Moammar Gadhafi, in charge of a regime 
whose horrors made Qatar look like an enlightened liberal democracy by 
comparison. Iran, whose oppressive and genocidal regime openly calls for the 
destruction for a fellow UN member, currently holds one of the (GA)Vice 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TRANSITIONS: 
CONTINUING EFFORTS AND (MUTUAL) ADAPTATION 
 
7 
Presidencies. In fact, Iran has also been put in charge of one of the committees, 
specifically on women’s rights, which is akin to appointing mass murderer 
Charles Manson as head of a committee to rehabilitate psychopaths. Lest we 
forget, if I may remind you, the UN Human Rights Council, which has among 
its members some of the most oppressive regimes in the world, in May 2010, 
witnessed the election of Libya as a member, with over 150 countries voting for 
the inclusion of the Gadhafi regime to this august body. Many of these states, in 
an Orwellian fashion, warmly praised the Libyan leader's “impressive 
commitment to human rights”. Sadly, then, the UN, this ultimate institutional 
global "aegis', has deteriorated into a kind of “theater of the absurd” 
characterized by endless distorted resolutions, an institution that may be better 
explained by the great, late Romanian playwright and satirist, Eugène Ionesco, 
than by international relations specialists or political scientists.  
There are additional international relations approaches. Rejecting many of 
the rationalist and materialist ideas of the modern era as developed in the XIXth 
and XXth centuries, critical theory, which regards world politics as a process of 
identity formation and discourse on many levels (rather than conflict and 
cooperation), has given rise to post-modernism, among which is constructivism. 
One can appreciate the attraction of constructivism, for it seems to give voice to 
variables that, at times, appear to be unrepresented, such as culture, class, race, 
and gender. Moreover, constructivism may appeal to certain intellectual sectors 
by emphasizing discursive practices and the ideational motor, while holding 
truth as socially constructed (that is, subjective), rather than objective. Decoding 
value-laden language and flirting with the borders of situational ethics, 
however, is problematic, for in a sense, there is a subjective multiplier to the 
"subjective" that can easily distort perception and analysis. Constructivism, with 
some exceptions, also misunderstands classical realism, where culture and 
identity are also important. And, although better discursive practices would be a 
boon to international and regional relations, as in the case of Eastern Europe, 
constructivism fails to successfully address the pivotal “security dilemma” that 
states continually confront.  
Where does all of this leave us? Each of the above approaches has some 
particular value, but it seems that liberal institutionalism and post-modernist 
theories, such as constructivism, have delivered even less of what they promise 
than the others, imperfect as those may be. Consequently, the scholar, or the 
student of international relations, putting himself in the position of the policy-
maker, may find that certain complex theoretical formulations have a vastly 
more difficult meld with practice than realism, for example.  
Some combinations though, do offer promise, including democratic peace 
theory. I would suggest that it is especially relevant to Eastern Europe (not a 
simply homogenous region) in the XXIst century. Again, it is an imperfect 
approach, with its own pitfalls, and limited to a particular grouping of states. 
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Rooted in Kantian theory (Perpetual Peace) and viewed through a modern 
iteration by Michael Doyle, for instance, it combines domestic variables 
(democracy, and more specifically, democratic constraint) with foreign 
variables that govern international behavior. The peaceful character of 
interaction, however, is restricted to relations among democracies (and here, 
definition is important). This is also crucial for the states of Eastern Europe in 
terms of peace and domestic and international adaptation. Geography is 
immutable; politics, however, are not. It is worrisome, then, that some states 
"east" of Eastern Europe may be drifting in a different direction than 
democracy, making the melding of theory and practice even more difficult.  
Nonetheless, the need for adaptation, domestically, regionally and 
internationally, remains. Moreover, adaptation functions along a continuum 
that, for the success of democracies, also has to pivot on key principles. Hence, 
we need the art of the balance.  
How do we then go forth in such an interactive international system? 
First, without getting into a debate of what is consolidated democracy, both new 
and older democracies need to protect and continue to nurture democratic 
principles and processes, in order to preserve the legitimacy of the political 
order. Without that legitimacy, it is ultimately extraordinarily difficult, if not 
entirely impossible, in the longer term to deal with the economic, social and 
international problems that all states confront.  
Second, despite the current difficult economic times, it is essential to 
minimize economic volatility, ensure long term growth through entrepreneurship, 
innovation and enhanced productivity, not only to preserve domestic social 
peace and satisfy key needs for equity, but also to become more effective 
participants in an intertwined international economic system.  
Third, states need to resist the seduction of collective security, which 
pending a fundamental, systemic transformation of the political world, is yet to 
achieve its central goals and deal effectively with the expensive but necessary 
drudgery of collective defense. In short, adaptation, particularly in Eastern 
Europe, cannot mean, at least for the foreseeable future, the forgoing of hard 
security guarantees, in exchange for the inspiring but yet unattainable promise 
of international legality and moral suasion.  
Fourth, Eastern Europe’s integration with the other half of the continent, 
after a long, tragic and unnatural separation, should not lead to isolation from 
the transatlantic partners, the U.S. and Canada. Both in terms of security and 
culture, this would be a mistake.  
Fifth, the North American partners, in turn, can ill afford to allow the 
isolation and neglect of Eastern Europe. Such actions in the past have proved to 
be extremely deleterious to international peace, and the North American 
partners need to resist isolationist instincts as part of their adaptation to the 
needs of the XXIst century.  
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The above are difficult tasks, both costly and unpredictable. Yet, I remain 
profoundly optimistic because of the perspective of the past two decades. 
Extraordinary transformation has taken place, and we see flickers of similar 
developments in many other parts of the world. As difficult as the road may be, 
the alternatives are far more costly and dangerous. Though again, we are going 
through difficult times, there are nevertheless enormous opportunities for 
progress and adaptation. It can be done together, I believe, within the 
community of democracies, one that should continue to enlarge. It is a 
multidimensional, interactive approach, melding theory and practice, resting on 
scholarship, statesmanship and partnership.  
Thank you again.  
